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Abstract
Contemporary scholars in the intersecting field of popular culture and Islamic stud-
ies have argued for the importance of researching the ways Muslims engage with, 
make meaning of, and (re)produce different forms of popular culture. The current 
study continues these endeavours by examining a hitherto understudied form of pop-
ular culture in this field, namely, Korean popular culture. As previous studies on 
Islam and popular culture have drawn attention to, the focus of this study is on how 
this specific form of popular culture has been in/compatible with Islamic values, 
beliefs, and practices. Taking Indonesia as a context, the current study asked: What 
are the various ways Indonesian Muslim fans negotiate their identities as a Muslim 
and a K-pop fan? Drawing upon interview data with Indonesian Muslim K-pop fans 
and publicly available literature such as media reports, news, and websites, the find-
ings exhibited at least four subject positions (available to be) taken up by Muslim 
K-pop fans, namely, (1) complete opposition, (2) partial opposition, (3) irrelevance, 
and (4) the interlacing of religious and fan subjectivity. The first two positions are 
predicated upon a belief that Islam and K-pop culture are in tensions, while the latter 
two consider there is no tension between one’s identity as a Muslim and a K-pop fan. 
This article contributes to the existing knowledge in the field of Islam and popular 
culture by offering a nuanced discussion on various possible forms of Muslim K-pop 
fans’ subjectivity.
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Introduction
Contemporary scholars in the intersecting field of popular culture and Islamic stud-
ies have argued for the importance of researching the ways Muslims engage with, 
make meaning of, and (re)produce different forms of popular culture. Popular 
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culture refers to “expressive practices of everyday life” (Nieuwkerk et al., 2016, p. 
10) which are generally “mass mediated, commercialised, pleasure-filled, humour-
ous, and representative of large segments of society” (Weintraub, 2011a, p. i), such 
as music, movies, television, magazines, comics, fashion, and online (sub)cultures. 
Getting less attention compared to the so-called “high-culture” such as calligraphy, 
Arabic music, or Islamic recitation (LeVine, 2008), popular culture may provide a 
window into the everyday life of the Muslim worlds, where meanings are discur-
sively contested and social imaginations are represented. As Nieuwkerk, LeVine, 
and Stokes (2016, p. 17) put it, it is in the “repetitiousness and ubiquity”, in the 
capacity to “enliven the bodies”, and in the ability to “provoke laughter, dance, new 
fashion and hairstyles, song, empathy, tears, jokes, stories, dreams”, that popular 
culture becomes a powerful site for ideological struggles by continuously contesting 
what it means to be(come) a Muslim in the modern society. Taking up this call, the 
current study joins these scholars to expand academic knowledge on the intersecting 
field of popular culture and Islam, and seeks to further represent the complexity of 
contemporary Muslim lives.
One of the major themes in the studies of Islam and popular culture is how vari-
ous forms of popular culture have been in/compatible with Islamic values, beliefs, 
and practices. Historically, many theologians of all religions have expressed con-
cerns over and imposed various degrees of restriction on engagement with popular 
cultures (Otterbeck & Ackfeldt, 2012). Since the Divine is understood as sacred, 
eternal, priceless, and in sharp contrast with popular culture which was considered 
fleeting, human-made, cheap, and worldly (Weintraub, 2011a), popular culture, 
therefore, was seen as leading people away from religion and morality. In Islam 
more specifically, some forbidding views positioned popular culture as al-malāhī 
or the diversions that indulge Muslims in worldly pleasures and distract them from 
religious devotion and obligations (Otterbeck & Ackfeldt, 2012). The entertain-
ing nature of popular culture was also often associated with sexuality, dance, and 
women’s bodies which were common sites of Islamic moral concerns (Weintraub, 
2011a). Nevertheless, previous studies have demonstrated how Islamic traditions 
over the generations were not only co-exist, but also blended with both traditional 
and modern forms of popular culture in complex and intricate ways. Some examples 
include heavy metal rock music (LeVine, 2008), punk (sub)cultures (Fiscella, 2012), 
nasyid music in Malaysia (Barendregt, 2012), dangdut music and dance in Indonesia 
(Weintraub, 2011b), gamelan and shadow puppets in Java (Sumarsam, 2011), and 
meuseukat in Aceh (Kartomi, 2011). Destabilising the monolithic, reductive, and 
Arab-oriented views of Islam, these international studies exhibit the dynamic and 
contested nature – both contextually and temporally – of the interplay between Islam 
and popular culture.
The current study contributes to these scholarship of Islam and popular culture 
by examining a hitherto understudied form of popular culture in this field, namely, 
Korean popular (K-pop) culture. Since entering the global market in the 2000s, 
K-pop industry has continuously grown into a major player in the international 
music industry with an estimation of USD 5 billion annual sales revenue (Bruner, 
2020). A popular K-pop boy band, BTS, for example, has topped iTunes chart in 90 
countries within 2 days of the release of its new album in November 2020 (BTS’ 
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New Album, 2020). Despite the (initial impression of) “huge cultural and value gap 
between Islamic beliefs and global K-pop contents” (Yoon, 2019, p. 3), at least four 
Muslim-majority countries are among K-pop’s top 20 markets, including Indone-
sia, Malaysia, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia (Hilton, 2020). Currently, there is still a 
dearth of socio-religious studies on Islam and K-pop culture. Among the limited 
number of existing studies on K-pop and Islam, researchers have focused on the 
business (Masood & Rahim, 2020), cultural (Jung & Shim, 2014; Malik, 2019), and 
consumer behaviour aspects of K-pop (Jeong et al., 2017; Jung, 2011) in Muslim-
majority countries such as Egypt, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Qatar. In the field of 
socio-religious studies, four relevant edited collections on the intersection of Islam 
and popular culture did not touch K-pop culture at all, including anthologies by Har-
nish and Rasmussen (2011), Weintraub (2011a), Hamamsy and Soliman (2013), 
and Nieuwkerk, LeVine, and Stokes (2016). To date, there is no research article on 
K-pop published in Contemporary Islam journal. Therefore, the current study seeks 
to begin filling this gap by examining the religious subjectivity of Muslim K-pop 
fans in one of the largest Muslim-majority K-pop market, namely, Indonesia.
Specifically, the research questions in this article are: What are the various ways 
Indonesian Muslim fans negotiate their identities as a Muslim and a K-pop fan? 
What subject positions as a Muslim fan are available within the contemporary Indo-
nesian religious landscape they inhabit? In what ways may K-pop culture become 
a site for contemporary debates on Islam, morality, and popular culture? Through 
these questions, the current study joins the wider academic endeavours to investi-
gate the interplay between religion, popular culture and the constitution of ostensi-
bly conflicting modern identities in contemporary Indonesia (e.g., Wallach, 2008). 
The answers to these questions – to some extent – may resonate with the findings in 
studies on Muslims’ engagement with other modern popular cultures; nevertheless, 
there are specific features of K-pop culture which are more pronounced as compared 
to them, such as the intense fandom engagement (more in the Findings section). The 
current study aims to begin illuminating this contextual interplay between Islam and 
K-pop culture in the ways Indonesian Muslim fans make meaning out of their expe-
rience. As religious meaning-making does not exist in historical and social vacuum, 
the next section will briefly introduce Indonesian contemporary contexts vis-à-vis 
Islam and popular culture.
Theoretically, this study was built upon the legacy of British cultural studies 
theorists (e.g., Richard Hoggart, Raymond Williams, and Stuart Hall) who (re)con-
nect texts and other cultural products with society and the individuals producing/
consuming them (Turner, 2003). Texts are understood as permeated with cultural 
meanings, discourses, and even ideologies. Culture, including popular culture, is 
considered as a site of ideological struggle where power relations are reconfigured. 
Here, an individual’s sense of self is not seen as essentialist, but conceptualised as 
“subjectivity” which is continuously constituted through multiple and shifting socio-
political-cultural discourses in a given context. As further argued by the later gen-
eration of British cultural studies scholars (John Storey, Dick Hebdige), the current 
study considered fans’ consumption of K-pop as production of culture (meanings, 
pleasures, etc.) in which K-pop is not just a commodity, but becomes a part of the 
fans’ cultural identity, personal history, feelings, and memories (Storey, 1999). Such 
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production of K-pop fan culture is political in the ways it represents symbolic forms 
of resistance or, as Hebdige (1979, p. 18, 127) puts it, an “oblique gesture of refusal” 
which challenges “the principle of unity and cohesion”, interrupts “the process of 
normalisation”, and contradicts “the myth of consensus” about – in the contexts of 
this study – being a Muslim and a fan.
A brief contextual introduction: Islam and popular culture 
in contemporary Indonesia
Indonesia, the world’s fourth most populous country and the home for the world’s 
largest Muslim population, have increasingly become a significant market for K-pop 
in recent years. With more than 850 thousand K-pop fan clubs (Oh, 2017), Indo-
nesia is the place for one of the biggest and strongest K-pop fandoms in Asia and 
the world (Yoon, 2019). The relatively wide acceptance of K-pop among Indo-
nesian young fans could be attributed – to a degree – to Indonesia’s long history 
of co-existing, even mutually constitutive, Islam and popular culture; particularly 
among the traditionally dominant Islamic groups such as Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) 
and Muhammadiyah. As argued by Weintraub (2011a, p. 3), Islam in Indonesia for 
many centuries has been characterised as “moderate Islam”, where “flexible inter-
pretations of major religious and legal sources regarding scripture, law, gender, and 
democracy that respond to the contemporary needs of Muslims … map(s) well onto 
popular culture as both are widespread, participatory, dialogic, and tolerant of diver-
sity …”. The term “seni Islam” or Islamic art (Harnish and Rasmussen 2011), for 
example, expresses the hybrid fuse of Islam and local popular culture – albeit not 
without contestations – such as in the ways Javanese shadow puppet incorporate Sufi 
themes (Sumarsam, 2011), Acehnese meuseukat female dance performing religious 
texts (Kartomi, 2011), and the use of dangdut music for da’wa (Irama, 2011).
Indonesia’s post-1998 democratic era witnessed the rise of Islamic conserva-
tism, which inevitably contested the long history of moderate stances on popular 
culture such as those of traditionalist NU and Muhammadiyah. As militaristic and 
social repressions on conservative and Islamist groups were lifted, expansions of 
conservative Islamic aspirations were increasingly perceptible in various social 
domains, from the growth of Islamist-leaning political parties and civil society 
organisations (e.g., Justice and Prosperity Party, Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia), public 
expressions of religiosity (particularly the hijab), to Islamic-oriented economy such 
as halal certification and sharia banking (Fealy, 2019). One of the significant mile-
stones, in terms of Islam and popular culture, was the passing of anti-pornography 
bill proposed by conservative fractions of the parliament in 2008 which criminal-
ises not only all forms of printed and online sexually explicit materials, but also 
bodily movements and gestures deemed as suggestive of sexual conduct and eroti-
cism (Undang-undang, 2008). The high-profile case leading to this legislation was 
a fatwa issued by the conservative MUI (Council of Islamic Ulama) against Inul 
Daratista, a popular dangdut singer, whose dancing, clothes, and stage performance 
were deemed pornographic and, therefore, incompatible with Islamic morality 
(Weintraub, 2011a). It is within these socio-politico-religious discursive landscape 
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of contemporary Indonesia characterised by tensions between the traditionally mod-
erate groups and the rising new conservatives that young Muslims cultivate their 
sense of identity, including – for some – the identity as a Muslim and a K-pop fan. 
In the next section, I will discuss contemporary academic knowledge on this specific 
intersection of Islam, K-pop, and religious subjectivity.
Literature review: key studies on Muslim K‑pop fan subjectivity
To date, studies specifically focusing on the religious subjectivity of the Muslim 
K-pop fans were still scarce. In this section I will discuss three most relevant key 
studies which have attempted to understand the ways Muslim K-pop fans negotiated 
their religious and fan identities. These three studies were chosen here because they 
provide valuable conceptual contributions to the available knowledge on K-pop and 
Muslim subjectivity, of which the current study is built on and seeks to extend.
The first is Yoon’s (2019, p. 17) ethnographic studies on Indonesian K-pop fans 
in Jogjakarta, where she interviewed young fans who are both pious Muslims and 
zealous lovers of K-pop. Yoon argued that these fans were “emulating Korean pop 
culture but not to evade from social norms and religious doctrine” by, for example, 
imitating their idols’ hairstyle underneath their hijab, wearing hot pants in their own 
bedroom, and applying Korean lip tint in the deep side of their lips. Yoon’s analy-
ses also drew attention to new masculine ideals and socio-spatial visions these fans 
adopted from K-pop as a form of resistance to the dominant gender and cultural 
norms, such as idealising hardworking and kind men, and wishing for clean and safe 
streets for women to roam around; which, most of the time, were unavailable in their 
everyday lives. However, Yoon did not intently delve into religious parts of the fans’ 
subjectivity, but rather, the wider socio-cultural-transnational contestations, such as 
gender norms. The current study seeks to expand these findings. My analyses (in the 
Findings section below), for example, found that Yoon’s participants only represents 
one or two out of several ways young Indonesian Muslims negotiate their religious 
and fan identities.
In contrast, Syed and Kwon’s (2019) study among Malaysian Muslim university 
students who were exchange students in Korea focused more intently on the reli-
gious subjectivity (as well as the gendered and transnational aspects), such as wear-
ing hijab and maintaining halal diet while living in Korea as a symbol of honour as 
a Muslim. However, Syed and Kwon did not specifically examine their identities as 
fans because the participants narrated more about their experience living in Korea 
rather than as a fan. For instance, their participants learned to put on Korean make 
up – and consider it a form of women empowerment in the public domain – since 
they arrived in Korea and “started to mix around” (Syed & Kwon, 2019, p. 16), not 
because they were K-pop fans. Another example is their comments on the incident 
of a Korean singer hugging and kissing Malaysian Muslim girls in a concert (Ahmad 
& Lee, 2016) which empathically positioned these fans as “a bunch of kids” (Syed 
& Kwon, 2019, p. 11) who should not be publicly shamed for their mistakes; and 
simultaneously distanced themselves from these “childish” fans. The current study 
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built on and complement these previous studies by focusing precisely and intently 
on the intersection of being a Muslim and a fan.
The third key study upon which the current article was built on and seeks to 
contribute is Oh’s (2017) study on Muslim K-pop fans in Indonesia and Palestine. 
Comparing both countries and connecting Islam with state violence, Oh explored 
the possibilities that K-pop culture delivers “a new cultural message to the Mus-
lim youths (predominantly female), who yearn for cultural liberation from oppres-
sions of all kinds” (Oh, 2017, p. 234) including gender, religious, and state oppres-
sions. While his Indonesian participants, to a degree, expressed this possibility, such 
as how K-pop inspired a more agentic version of womanhood, or how a Christian 
Chinese-descendant fan feared reactionary responses from hard-line Muslim groups 
or the government, Oh’s analysis might be problematic on several grounds. Firstly, 
the undertones of Oh’s article appear to equate Islam and Muslim-majority coun-
tries with female oppression (“all local cultures in the Islam countries [sic] seem 
to discriminate against women”, Oh, 2017, p. 235). Secondly, Oh imprecisely posi-
tioned Indonesia as a conservative “Islamic state”, without considering the spectrum 
of progressive-conservative Islamic influences on Indonesian socio-cultural-politics 
– like the development of Islamic feminist movements (e.g., Robinson, 2006) – such 
as when he claimed: “While Islam has changed its faces over various historical 
periods in the two countries, what remained unchanged was women’s status under 
Islam” (Oh, 2017, p. 248). Thirdly, drawing upon a single evidence of apprehen-
sion from a fan, Oh might have exaggerated the potential of state violence towards 
K-pop fans which, he acknowledged himself hitherto unproven (“There has not yet 
been any state violence reported on the Islamic women who consume Hallyu [K-pop 
wave] in large quantities in each country”, Oh, 2017, p. 244). In fact, while tak-
ing her daughter to a K-pop concert, the president Jokowi called himself “a K-pop 
fan” when interviewed by a Korean media (Yolanda, 2016), which is not surprising 
considering the potential of the pop culture industry in the eyes of this economic-
growth-oriented president. Acknowledging that Oh’s findings might have a degree 
of credibility albeit sometimes imprecise and one-sided, the current article seeks to 
offer a more nuanced analysis, namely, a range of possible discursively-constituted 
subject positions occupied by Indonesian Muslim K-pop fans; with an awareness of 
the complexities of contemporary Indonesia’s political, religious, cultural, and dis-
cursive tensions.
Methodology
The current study drew upon two forms of qualitative data, namely existing lit-
erature and interview transcripts, to explore various ways of being an Indonesian 
Muslim K-pop fan. The literature here refers to both popular online sources such as 
news, websites, and blogs; and academic publications, including narratives quoted 
in them. For the popular source, the purpose was to explore various messages in 
online sources which are readily available for and easily accessed by young people. 
To this end, two search terms, namely “K-pop & Islam” and “Hallyu & Islam” were 
applied in Google Indonesia (google.co.id.) search engine on July 2020. The first 
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five pages generated were saved and analysed as data; the exclusion criteria was aca-
demic sources and online shop advertisements. The final number of popular sources 
analysed was 41. For the scholarly search, both search terms were applied in five 
scholarly search engines or databases, namely, Sage, Springer, Taylor and Francis, 
Wiley, and Google Scholar Indonesia. The inclusion criteria was original, empirical 
research that analysed data on experiences as or scandals involving Muslim K-pop 
fans published between 2010 and 2020; the exclusion criteria was student papers. 
The final number of scholarly sources included was 16.
Interview participants were recruited by posting advertisement on student instant 
messaging groups in the researcher’s university and the research assistant’s social 
media accounts. The criteria were Indonesian Muslim, female, 16–24 years old, and 
self-identified as a K-pop fan for at least one year. Considering global K-pop fandom 
is overwhelmingly women, only female fans were recruited for this study; male fans 
might be an exceptionally unique niche. Participants who responded to the advertise-
ment were given an information sheet and an opportunity to ask questions about the 
study. Upon completing the consent form (and parental consent for under 18 years), 
each participant was interviewed in a 1-h session of audio-taped, semi-structured, 
narrative interview. Additionally, brief correspondences (1–3 times) via instant mes-
saging were conducted when necessary, such as to confirm or probe some answers 
during the interview. At the end of the interview, participants were asked whether 
they can forward the advertisement to other fans they know. The total number of 
participants is 26. While their views on their own religiosity are varied from not 
very religious to relatively religious, all are affiliated with the dominant moderate 
groups, namely, NU or Muhammadiyah. The interview questions include their first 
engagement with K-pop, their activities as a fan, their religious background, their 
views on their own religiosity, and their views on faith and fandom. The interviews 
were conducted in the participants’ first language, that is, Indonesian language. The 
interviewers were the researcher and the research assistant, who are native Indone-
sian speakers. All participant names in this article are pseudonyms. The data col-
lected (popular and scholarly literature, and interview transcripts) were analysed 
using a thematic analysis technique (Braun & Clarke, 2006), in which researchers 
familiarised themselves with the data, organised them, and then identified, specified, 
and reviewed themes emerging from the data.
Findings
The analyses revealed at least four subject positions which have been, or available to 
be, taken up by Indonesian Muslim fans in understanding and acting upon the inter-
play between their faith and K-pop fandom. These four ways of being can be grouped 
into two categories: those representing “tensions” and “no tensions” between their 
subjectivity as a fan and a Muslim. The “tension” category can be divided into two 
sub-categories or positions, namely, (1) complete opposition, and (2) partial opposi-
tion between Islam and K-pop. The “no tension” category also has two sub-catego-
ries, that is, (3) irrelevance and (4) the interlacing of the subjectivity as a Muslim 
and a fan. It is important to note that these positions might not be strictly separated, 
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as some fans simultaneously occupied more than one subject position. The analyses 
were also cannot be separated from the contextuality of participants in this study, 
namely, Muslim fangirls living in Indonesia with its specific gender, religious, his-
torical, and cultural contexts. These four positions will be discussed below.
“Muslim fans must repent”: Complete opposition between Islam and K‑pop
[The Korean Wave] offers something interesting, and refreshing like water,
which actually draws Muslims into the fire [of hell] … Muslim fans of K-pop 
[must] repent.
 ~ Fuadh Naim, a popular conservative preacher (Arbi, 2019: para. 6 and 8).
As illustrated in the quotation above, the first position considers that being a 
Muslim and a K-pop fan is completely opposing each other, and Muslim fans must 
choose one or the other. This position represents conservative Muslim groups’ 
stance, who have made their views readily available and easily accessible in vari-
ous Indonesian online platforms (Fealy, 2019). There are at least three arguments 
within this position. Firstly, it is forbidden to admire a non-Muslim celebrity. As 
articulated by one of the most popular conservative preachers, Ustad Abdul Somad 
(Hukum menggemari artis Korea 2017): “Koreans are infidels (kafir). Do not like 
infidels. Whoever [likes] infidels, he/she is a part of the infidels.” Another online 
popular source entitled “Islamic Law on Liking K-Pop (Hukum Menyukai K-pop, 
n.d.), quoted scriptures and hadiths such as QS. Al Mujadilah: 22: “You will not 
find a people who believe in Allah and the Last Day having affection for those who 
oppose Allah and His Messenger” and “No one loves a people but one who will be 
gathered with them on the Day of Resurrection”; to demonstrate that Islam opposes 
K-pop fandom because of the religion of the Korean artists, and the consequence is 
to be gathered with them in hell. Correspondingly, a participant in this study (Jessi, 
21 yo) succinctly summarised what she knows about Islamic teachings on K-pop: 
“K-pop fans are kafir”. These exclusionary remarks position K-pop fans outside of 
the Islamic faith, which implies one of the most sinful things to do in Islam, namely, 
leaving the religion (murtad).
The second argument is that K-pop culture opposes various aspects of Islamic 
sexual morality, and therefore, is sinful. Discussions in blogs and forums on 
K-pop and Islam often pointed out the relatively relaxed mingling and intimate 
relationships between unmarried men and women in K-pop music videos or dra-
mas, which are against conservative Islamic norm of avoiding courtship or dating 
(e.g., Siro, n.d.). The frequently-cited scripture is “a man should never be alone 
with a woman, unless the woman is with her guardian” (e.g., Yulianto, 2017). 
Concerns around physical proximity between sexes which implies gestures of 
intimacy and sexual textures have also underpinned condemnations against veiled 
Malaysian Muslim fans being hugged and kissed on stage by a K-pop singer in 
a concert in 2015 (Ahmad & Lee, 2016). Another problematic aspect of K-pop 
according to conservative Islamic sexual morality is that Korean artists, videos, 
and dramas display aurat, that is, parts of women’s body that should be cov-
ered by a hijab. There was moral panic around concerns that young Muslim girls 
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might imitate K-pop clothing. A participant in this study, Alina (20 yo), admitted 
that she did “want to imitate K-pop clothing” but, she “thanked God” she was 
“strong enough not to”. Another example is an Indonesian petition signed more 
than 127,000 times in 2018 against an online marketplace advertisement featuring 
Korean girl band, Blackpink, wearing off-shoulder, short skirt dresses (Hentikan 
iklan Blackpink Shopee, n.d.). Maimon Herawati, the petition initiator, argued 
that the advertisement exposes aurat, is inappropriate for children, and displays 
seductive expressions and bodily movements. Here, K-pop is deemed represent-
ing sexual immorality from which young Muslim girls are positioned as needing 
protection.
Thirdly, indulging oneself in entertainment or sexual pleasure through pop 
culture is seen as hedonistic and against Islamic values of modesty. The K-pop 
industry has mastered the art of building emotional connections and maintaining 
fandom hitherto unequalled by any other modern popular culture (see Jung, 2011; 
Jung & Shim, 2014). K-pop keeps fans hooked up through market-tested strate-
gies such as – among others – intense social media engagement, constant updates, 
online forums, merchandises, fan fictions, and live apps peeking into the artists’ 
everyday life. Thus, to be overly passionate and intensely involved in any non-
Islamic activities, like being a K-pop fan, is deemed fundamentally problematic 
especially because K-pop represents “youth lifestyles full of worldly pleasures, 
and encouraging Muslim youth to follow such lifestyles” (Firsty, 2014). An Indo-
nesian Islamic website featuring an article entitled “K-pop virus and the decon-
struction of Islamic faith” (Saad, 2012) even labelled K-pop as a “latent threat 
for Muslims”, “polluting Indonesia’s famously polite culture”, “eroding Islamic 
morality”, “bourgeois”, “hedonist”, and “materialist”.
This position of “complete opposition” has evidently been taken up by Muslim 
fans as documented in previous studies, and also by some participants in the cur-
rent study. Adila (21 yo), a participant in this study, was aware that being a K-pop 
fan opposes her faith and she had to choose one over another. She comfortably 
chose K-pop because she considered herself as “not very religious anyway.” In 
Sirry’s (2020) study among radical-leaning groups in Indonesian universities, a 
participant reported how the Islamic group she joined condemned K-pop and it 
caused a religious moral dilemma for her as a K-pop fan. This “complete oppo-
sition” position constituted through conservative Islamic discourses was what 
precisely made her leave that radical-leaning group. Some of Yoon’s (2019) par-
ticipants also represented the taking up of this subject position which resulted 
in clandestine practices of emulating K-pop culture among Indonesian fans, such 
as enjoying K-pop in the secrecy of their bedroom, setting their hair like Korean 
stars underneath their hijab, and wearing hot pants only in their private space; 
because K-pop culture was understood as opposing the general rules of their faith. 
As a participant in our study noted (Mira, 21 yo, self-identifying as an ex-fan), 
“repentance – leaving K-pop fandom – is the only way out for Muslims.” This 
“complete opposition” stance signifies, continues, and expands tensions between 
rising Islamic conservatism and popular culture in contemporary Indonesia (Har-
nish & Rasmussen, 2011; Weintraub, 2011b).
 Contemporary Islam
1 3
Islamised K‑pop and “K‑popped” Islam: Partial opposition between Islam 
and K‑pop
As Allah said, “Oh mankind, we created you from a single (pair) of a male 
and female, and we made you into nations and tribes, that you may know each 
other (not that you may despise each other).” But in that purview, Islam limits 
this mixing by taking only the useful things from the culture and the things 
that match with Islam. You should reject what goes against Islam and its val-
ues. There are some sides of Hallyu that Islam forbids such as singing and 
dancing and the intense relationships between the two genders. (Maysa, Pales-
tinian K-pop fan, a participant in Oh, 2017, p. 249)
In contrast with the “complete opposition” position, the second position – which 
still implies tensions between Islam and K-pop – considers only some parts of K-pop 
culture as opposing Islamic beliefs. Here, being a Muslim fan is possible or not fun-
damentally wrong, as long as the problematic parts are avoided. As illustrated by 
Oh’s (2017) Palestinian participant above, Muslim fans can “filter out” aspects of 
K-pop which they considered religiously wrong, and take only the good things from 
K-pop. This is the most popular position among participants in the current study, 
which discursively challenges the conservatives’ strict oppositional positioning of 
Islam and K-pop. In this section I further argue that, this partially opposing subject 
position has consequentially given rise to different forms of religio-cultural redefi-
nition, including Islamised versions of K-pop culture, and “K-popped” versions of 
Islamic culture.
Corresponding to the three reasons about how K-pop is in opposition to Islam in 
the previous section, there have been ways to give meaning differently to Islam and 
K-pop which circumvented those three reasons, as demonstrated by fans and Mus-
lim communities in previous studies and in popular media. Firstly, when admiring a 
non-Muslim is considered sinful, admiring Muslim K-pop stars may solve the prob-
lem. In Indonesia, there has been media coverage on Muslim Korean artists, such 
as Manny, a member of the Varsity K-pop boy band (Sadikin & Suliastini, 2018), 
Daud Kim, a Korean Youtuber and singer (Garjito, 2020), and, most notably, Ayana 
Jihye Moon, a veiled Korean Internet celebrity (3 fakta Ayana Moon, 2020). Some 
of them are converts, and others were born Muslim. Unsurprisingly, these Muslim 
Korean celebrities are increasingly gaining a considerable number of followers in 
Indonesia (Marhendri, 2020).
Secondly, when K-pop culture is deemed morally wrong because it could 
encourage Muslim fangirls to expose their aurat, some Indonesian Muslim fans, 
such as in Novchi, Hanafi, and Arlizon’s study (2018, p. 49), imitated K-pop fash-
ion selectively in ways that do not expose aurat: “Muslim clothes … are more 
polite. [We dressed] polite[ly], but similar [to Korean stars]. Just like that, not 
[copying] everything.” These fans demonstrated that enjoying K-pop does not 
imply mindless imitations of K-pop culture, but they appropriated such foreign 
culture and aligned it with local religious values (Rosidi, 2016). This is similar 
to the Islamic take on Japanese pop culture of costume play (cosplay), namely, 
hijabi cosplay (Gittinger, 2018) in which Muslim fans dressed up as an anime 
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character but were still covered by a veil. These Islamised versions of K-pop evi-
dence and continue the history of hybrid fuse between Islam and popular culture 
in the Malay world (Harnish & Rasmussen, 2011). Simultaneously, fangirls tak-
ing up this position disrupted the hegemonic ideas about young Muslim girls who 
need protection from external influences corrupting their sexual morality by dem-
onstrating that they are agentic, understand religio-cultural boundaries, and able 
to make reasonable decisions for themselves.
Thirdly, when overly indulging oneself in worldly entertainment is considered 
sinful, some Indonesian fans in the current study moderated and controlled the 
indulgence, arguing that being a fan is unproblematic as long as “religious obliga-
tions (especially praying five times a day) are not abandoned” (Alia, 21 yo; Peep, 
21 yo; Putri 25 yo), and thus refusing K-pop being framed as inevitable al-malāhī. 
Other limits participants set between sinful or not include “being majnun or stupid 
or irrational” (Siti, 21 yo) and “worshipping (K-pop) idol” (Agnes, 21 yo; Aisyah, 
22 yo) or “making K-pop idol god” (Cheeze, 23 yo; Peep, 21 yo) which evokes the 
notion of shirk. In taking up subject positions where only some aspects of K-pop 
or some forms of engagement with K-pop are considered opposing Islamic beliefs, 
these fans have navigated ways to be both a good Muslim and a fan; and simultane-
ously, created unique versions of Islamic K-pop fandom. In so doing, these “moder-
ate” fan subjectivity discursively contests strict conservative teachings on Islam and 
K-pop widely available in the Indonesian popular online sources.
Further, it is not only the K-pop industry that sought to capitalise on the growing 
Muslim fandom, but also conservative Islamic groups in Indonesia. For instance, the 
organiser of Hijrah Fest – a modern take on Islamic rally – admittedly took K-pop-
like strategies in the design of their events. Accommodating the new Indonesian 
Muslim middle-class, their annual events were held in the luxurious Jakarta Con-
vention Center, featuring born-again (hijrah) celebrities and business people. They 
charged a daily entrance ticket of 95,000 rupiah which steered clear the event from 
lower class visitors. One of the event’s organisers was interviewed by the media and 
he said: “I was a K-pop fan. But after I hijrah, I want to take advantage of K-pop 
popularity for dakwah, for K-pop fans in Indonesia” (Aurelia, 2019: para. 32). The 
K-pop-like strategies identified by this media report include inviting preachers with 
a large number of social media followers, providing meet-and-greet-like sessions, 
and selling halal products in a pop-up market featuring popular vendors and startups 
akin to anime conventions. Ayana Jihye Moon, for example, was invited as one of 
the speakers. With more than 3 million Instagram followers, she was welcomed by 
a large number of visitors who were enthusiastically lined up to shake her hand and 
take selfies – a scene which was reminiscent of K-pop fandom. Beside Hijrah Fest, 
another example of adopting popular culture for Islamic dakwah can be found in the 
Indonesian preacher who popularised himself as Ustad Naruto (Ada Ustaz Naruto, 
2018). Capitalising on Japanese pop culture fandom, he wore the costume of Naruto, 
a popular anime character, when preaching to expand his appeal to young J-pop fans. 
By selectively filtering out things that are opposing Islamic beliefs and taking only 
the “good” things from K-pop for Islamic endeavours, this position of partial oppo-
sition provides Muslims with ways to enjoy the pleasure of fandom either through 
an Islamised version of K-pop, or “K-popped” versions of Islamic faith.
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“It has nothing to do with my religious life”: K‑pop as irrelevant with one’s faith
I think there is only difference in culture between Indonesia and Korea…
but I have never seen Korean stuff from religious perspective.”
 ~ An Indonesian Muslim K-pop fan, cited in Yoon (2019)
While the first two subject positions discussed in this article were predicated 
upon a belief that Islam and K-pop culture are in tension, the final two subject posi-
tions focus on Muslim fan subjectivity which considers there is no tension between 
one’s identity as a Muslim and being a K-pop fan. This section will discuss the first 
no-tension subject position, that is, Muslim fans who see their faith as irrelevant 
with their practices and subjectivity as a fan. These fans did not think about K-pop 
from a religious perspective, and did not feel that there were tensions between the 
two. Although quite limited, there were glimpses of such subject positions among 
participants in the current study, as well as in previous studies.
One initial evidence can be seen in Hong and Lee’s (2017) quantitative study 
on patterns of K-pop consumption among Buddhist, Muslim, and Catholic fans in 
Vietnam, Malaysia, Costa Rica, Peru, and Chile. Published as a conference paper, 
the methodological and theoretical robustness of their study might not be exception-
ally convincing. Nevertheless, their study evidenced there was at least an indica-
tion that some fans have responded “it has nothing to do with religion” when asked 
directly about the impact of K-pop on their religious life; in their case, the major-
ity of respondents from three religions chose that answer. Based on this data, Hong 
and Lee (2017, p. 139) concluded that “Korean culture and content does not help, 
nor disturb the religious life.” However, this quantitative data was unable to explain 
further how fans articulated such irrelevance, particularly Muslim fans, amidst the 
apparent tensions between Islam and K-pop as discussed in previous sections.
Qualitative data from the current study might complement Hong and Lee’s (2017) 
statistics. One participant, Anna (21 yo), is a university student who diligently 
observes Islamic teachings and rituals. She considered herself as coming from “a 
conservative family in a particularly conservative region in Indonesia”. She was able 
to explain why many Muslims – including her father – frown upon listening to pop 
music, attending concerts, going to the cinema, and even watching TV; because none 
of these contribute to their raison d’être, that is, spiritual growth. It was not until I 
specifically asked “what about your opinion”, that she stopped repeatedly using the 
phrase “in Islam, …”, and started expressing her own views. She explained:
In my view, I know they [Korean artists] are not Muslims, but I don’t focus 
on that part. I like Seventeen, for example, I don’t see their religion, or values 
or influence they bring. Those do not influence me at all. I am interested in 
their dance, their choreo[graphy], that’s all. Watching their concert relieves my 
stress, it is really just for entertainment.
In this narrative, Anna does not consider religion as a relevant issue in being a fan. 
For Anna, consuming K-pop as entertainment has nothing to do with the Korean artists’ 
or her religion. Since Korean celebrities she liked did not promote their religions, and 
she did “not focus on that part”, she did not find their religions or values influencing 
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her. This notion of “just for entertainment” is also precisely the discourse drawn upon 
by Yoon’s (2019) Muslim participants in explaining the irrelevance of their Islamic 
faith and K-pop fandom (“… anyway it’s for entertainment …”, Yoon, 2019, p. 11). 
Other expressions relating to this position from participants in the current study include 
“no need to mix hobby and religion” (Cheeze, 23 yo) and “religion and hobby are dif-
ferent, they have their own place” (Fira, 21 yo). Here, religion and entertainment/hobby 
were considered two different domains of life, which did not necessarily influence each 
other. In this way, these participants demonstrated the ways in which Muslim fans may 
position their Islamic faith as having nothing to do with K-pop fandom.
It is noteworthy that, Anna (21 yo) and other participants displayed a repeated pat-
tern of explaining Islamic teachings on K-pop, then followed by phrases “but for me” 
(Jessi, 21 yo) or “according to me” (Ceri, 20 yo) to express their own interpretations. 
Considering the generally authoritative manners of religious teaching in Indonesia, 
such gesture represents a subversive exercise of agency where young Muslim girls 
expressed disagreement with religious authority and claimed their own voice through 
their engagement with K-pop. Ceri’s (20 yo) narrative best demonstrates such exercise 
of agency:
According to me, music is the least harmful thing in the world. As long as we don’t 
use it for something evil, I – as a Muslim – have no problem with K-pop music. If 
someone says it sinful, I think it is a matter between me and Allah. I don’t think 
humans can easily interpret Allah’s message. We’re just humans after all.
However, there might be some limitations within this analysis. It can be argued 
that ideological shifts might have happened discursively or even subconsciously. 
Since Anna became a K-pop fan, for example, she prefers soft masculinity, “hygienic, 
and boyfriendable boys”, which was different from the dominant masculine norms 
in Indonesia (Yoon, 2019). Islam, as the main source of her life values, might have 
been partially replaced by K-pop culture without her being aware of it. Ostensibly two 
disconnected domains, previous studies have shown how K-pop as an entertainment 
could became a channel for feminist discourses contesting one’s conservative religious 
beliefs, such as how Muslim participants’ in Syed and Kwon’s (2019) study encouraged 
women to speak up. Similarly, after watching Korean dramas and music videos, fans in 
Yoon’s (2019) study wished for safe streets for women to roam; pushing the boundary 
of traditionally domesticated roles of women. Instead of Islamic feminism, K-pop cul-
ture became the source of such discursive contestations. While Hong and Lee’s (2017) 
claim that K-pop does not disturb nor help fans’ religious life – therefore, irrelevant to 
their faith – might have a degree of credibility, there is also a possibility that K-pop 
discursively contesting religion as the source of life values, socio-spatial visions, and 
criteria of an ideal boyfriend.
“Assalamualaikum, annyeonghaseyo”: The interlacing of Islam and K‑pop 
in the constitution of Muslim fans’ subjectivity
I found that Korean culture as reflected in the Korean television dramas is 
Islamic.
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~ Bunga, an Indonesian Muslim K-pop fan (cited in Rosidi, 2016, p. 17)
The final subject position I discuss here under the no tension category is the inter-
lacing of one’s identity as a fan and as a Muslim. While acknowledging differences 
and opposing aspects, some fans demonstrated that they emphasised more on the 
similarities and cross-connections between K-pop and Islam. Struggling to reconcile 
the tensions, therefore, was not a major part in the constitution of their subjectivity 
as a Muslim fan. Quite the opposite, these fans spoke about ways in which one’s 
identity as a fan made them a better Muslim, and how being a Muslim enhanced 
one’s experience as a fan. As the epigraph above showed, there have been studies 
identifying and demonstrating such subject position, as well as participants in the 
current study, albeit quite rare.
One participant in the current study representing this position is Lila, a 16-year-
old high school student who identifies herself as a K-pop fan. As a daughter of a 
progressive Muslim preacher, Islam has been an important context of her life; she 
went to Islamic schools, she learned to read the Quran since kindergarten, and she 
believes Islam is the “guide of her life”. Like Anna, Lila is aware of the tensions 
between K-pop culture and Islamic teachings, but, personally, she did not attribute 
great importance to such opposing aspects. Unlike Anna, Lila considered her “pro-
gressive” father as relatively supportive of her interests in K-pop. Throughout the 
interview she frequently expressed cross-references between Islam and K-pop, dem-
onstrating how K-pop culture and religion were intertwined in her sense of self. For 
instance, Lila called the early phase of her being a fan (when K-pop was her only 
reason to live everyday, when she abandoned her homework and grades, when she 
was aggresive towards anyone criticising K-pop) as “the age of Jahiliyah” (i.e., the 
word Muslims use to refer to the age of ignorance in pre-Islamic Arabia). Lila also 
referred to a saying from the Hadith (a major source of Islamic teachings apart from 
the Quran) “cleanlines is next to godliness” when she passionately argued that it is 
good for men to take good care of his body and hygiene, like male Korean artists 
she liked. Currently considering herself a more mature fan, she now emphasised the 
importance of moderation in being a fan (“it’s okay to be a fan, just don’t [be] too 
much”), which is reminiscent of the moderate Islamic tradition her family is affili-
ated with (NU), as well as in the tone of her talk about religious morality (“who are 
we to accuse someone as sinful”, “as long as we don’t hurt others”). As these nar-
ratives show, Lila’s ways of being a fan and a Muslim were closely interlaced, both 
affecting each other, both became a lens to give meaning to the way the other was 
experienced.
There were at least five points of cross-connections between Islam and K-pop that 
have been identified by fans taking up this subject position, including fans in the cur-
rent and previous studies. The first is cleanliness, as mentioned by Lila above. Mus-
lim fans in previous studies also highlighted cleanliness they saw in K-pop culture 
as an Islamic aspiration. In addition to Lila who talked about men’s personal cleanli-
ness and care, Muslim participants in Rosidi et al. (2019, p. 222) study commented 
on public cleanliness: “In Korean dramas, I saw the neighbourhoods are clean, no 
garbage … the streets are nice, and no garbage on the streets. Indonesia has to be 
like that too!” Rosidi et al. (2019) then concluded that Korean dramas contributed to 
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the enactment of Islamic values of cleanliness to Indonesian Muslim fans. Similarly, 
Yoon (2019) who is a Korean researcher, was surprised how much her Indonesian 
Muslim participants talked about streets and garbage when they compared Korea 
and Indonesia.
Secondly, another Islamic value highlighted by Muslim K-pop fans in previous 
studies is being hardworking. Indonesian participants in Oh’s (2017), Rosidi et al.’s 
(2019), and Yoon’s (2019) study saw in Korean dramas and among K-pop artists 
that the protagonists worked really hard to find a job, to study for examinations, or 
to rise as a K-pop star. Rosidi et al. (2019) connected these K-pop representations 
of hard work with a verse from the Quran (At Taubah 9, p. 105): “Work; so Allah 
will see your work and (so will) His Apostle and the believers”, and further claimed 
that K-pop culture “can teach Islamic values for young Indonesian Muslims” (Rosidi 
et al., 2019, p. 223).
Thirdly, K-pop’s representations of family values have also been pointed out by 
Muslim fans as enhancing their religious beliefs and practices. These fans identi-
fied how Korean dramas and music videos were imbued with family values, such 
as “showing respect to elders” (Syed & Kwon, 2019, p. 16), “honoring one’s par-
ents” (Oh, 2017, p. 249), “family ties are strong” (Oh, 2017, p. 250), and “youth 
respecting their father or mother” (Rosidi et al., 2019, p. 221). For some fans, these 
portrayal of family values were reminiscent of the Islamic concept of silat al-rahim, 
that is, the Islamic moral value of nurturing relationship between family members 
and in the society, including respecting the elders (ElDakhakhny, 2017).
Fourthly, some participants in the current study (Agnes, 21 yo; Peep, 21 yo; Siti, 
21 yo) described their involvements in K-pop fan groups as enhancing their religios-
ity because they engaged in sadaqah or charity such as making a group donation 
for those in need under the name of their favourite Korean artist/band. As Siti (21 
yo) narrated: “Helping other is a sunnah for Muslims, and that’s what we did to cel-
ebrate our K-pop star’s birthday.”
The fifth is religion and K-pop as sources of comfort and strength that go hand in 
hand. As Agnes (21 yo) described: “I was once on my lowest point. The first thing 
I did was salat and tell everything I felt to Allah. Then I listened to relatable K-pop 
songs … so I’m still alive until now”. In the increasingly neoliberalised Indonesia, 
both market and parental pressures for youth to study hard and work hard often 
result in poor mental health (Wijaya Mulya et  al., 2021a). For these participants, 
K-pop and Islam became ways of “healing from everyday life”, sources of “comfort 
words” and “sense of being loved” (Fira, 21 yo) – a spiritual refuge from harsh capi-
talist competitive worlds, an empowering energy to survive depressing and suicidal 
thoughts (“so I’m still alive until now”, Agnes, 21 yo).
Further, a participant in this research, Aisyah (22 yo), took K-pop further into 
critical reflections on the nature of religion, God, and life: “I sometimes immersed 
in K-pop too far. Once realising it I immediately istighfar (seeking Allah’s forgive-
ness), but not because I fear Allah is jealous, rather, I need to be balanced (tawa-
zun). Allah doesn’t need me to worship that much anyway. Life isn’t black and 
white, it’s all about balance.” Through Aisyah’s engagement with K-pop, she dem-
onstrates a spiritual understanding of Islam; one that is not doctrinal and authorita-
tive, nor focusing on obedience, morality, and piety as commonly advocated by the 
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conservatives (Wijaya Mulya et al., 2021b). The constitution of her subjectivity as 
a Muslim K-pop fan here evidenced a resistance against the widespread conserva-
tive Islamic discourses in contemporary Indonesia. A spiritual approach to Islam 
and K-pop can also be found in ElDakhakhny’s (2017) autobiographical research on 
being a Muslim K-pop fan in Egypt. As she started to learn some Korean vocabular-
ies, she was fascinated by the meaning of Korean greeting annyeonghaseyo which 
translates as “Have you been well/at peace?”. She could not help but seeing the 
meaning of the greeting as strikingly similar to Arabic greeting, assalamuaikum, 
which is commonly used among Muslim communities all over the world, including 
in Indonesia. This Arabic greeting means peace be upon you, and God’s mercy and 
blessings. As in ElDakhakhny’s experience, the centrality of the word “peace” in 
these greetings may serve as a spiritual linkage for Muslim K-pop fans, namely, a 
reminder of the common humanity across religions, traditions, and (pop) cultures. 
At this spiritual level of understanding social realities, identities as a K-pop fan and 
a Muslim can be entwined in a harmonious co-existence.
Conclusion
This article has discussed various ways Muslim K-pop fans negotiated the inter-
play between their religious and fan subjectivity. The analysis revealed there are at 
least four subject positions (available to be) taken up by Muslim fans; from com-
plete opposition, partial opposition, irrelevance, to the interlacing of identities as a 
Muslim and a fan. These findings are not intended to be comprehensive nor exhaus-
tive, but to modestly illustrate various possibilities of being and becoming a Muslim 
K-pop fan. While located in a specific geographical situation (i.e., Indonesia), some 
of the data analysed also included relevant narratives from other Muslim communi-
ties, so that findings in this study might also resonate with Muslims in other places 
– although carefulness is necessary in terms of the transferability of the study. This 
article contributes to the existing knowledge in the field of Islam and popular cul-
ture by offering an initial, nuanced discussion on various possible forms of Muslim 
K-pop fans’ subjectivity.
The implications of the current research are as follows. Firstly, for Muslim K-pop 
fans, this article offers discursive resources on various possibilities of becoming a 
fan. For fans who felt lacking in agency, drawing upon alternative discourses and 
giving meaning differently to their sense of self can be an agentic act of ideological 
resistance – since the personal is political – and simultaneously, can be therapeuti-
cally liberating. Secondly, for the K-pop industry, a better understanding of Mus-
lim fans’ religious subjectivities may inspire marketing strategies which are more 
diverse and more accommodative of the fans’ contextual situations, for example, 
a hijab-friendly K-pop fashion niche. Thirdly, for future studies, the current arti-
cle identified some vague glimpses of various other domains of discursive con-
testation when K-pop cultures encountered local Muslim fandom, such as gender, 
sexuality, socio-spatial justice, and neoliberal ethos (e.g., hardworking individuals 
who are responsibilised for their own success). Future studies may explore these 
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contestations to further examine the complexities of the constitution of Muslim 
K-pop fans’ subjectivity.
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